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Abstract
This paper proposes a pricing framework that combines the oc-
currence of supply interruptions with nancial compensations. Con-
sumers post ex ante demands for a designated period. These demands
are met if ex post supply capacity is su¢ cient. However, when supply
is inadequate, all ex ante demands will be equi-proportionally rationed
with compensation being paid for any unserved demand. Consumers
posts their demands based on their expectations on the reliability of
the supply system. The model is closed by imposing rational expecta-
tions. We identify that while a consumers ex ante power demand will
be decreasing in the power price and increasing in the compensation
rate, it will be increasing when there is a mean-preserving spread in
the riskiness of future supplies, provided the consumer is su¢ ciently
prudent, i.e., when his coe¢ cient of relative prudence exceeds two, and
his coe¢ cient of interruption aversion exceeds one. We also derive
the welfare maximising price and show that when consumers are su¢ -
ciently prudent, pessimistic (equilibrium) expectations on the supply
reliability warrant a higher price compared with a situation of supply
adequacy.
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1 Introduction
The need to restore stability whenever supply is inadequate poses a ma-
jor challenge for the operators of electric power systems, power utilities and
other related enterprises. This is because failure to maintain a consistent
supply-demand balance within the power network could result in the break-
down of the entire system, spawning severe economic, social and political
consequences.
For example on August 14, 2003, signicant portions of the north-eastern
United States and Canada were plunged into darkness, leaving three major
cities, businesses and several millions of people paralysed by the lack of elec-
tric power for up to two days. The incident began with a relatively minor
disturbance that generated some instability in a sub-unit of the power system
(located in Ohio). The supply-demand balance in the local power system was
however not restored in a timely manner, allowing the problem to escalate
into a transborder crisis costing millions of dollars. This problem could how-
ever have been nipped in the bud if there was an e¤ective mechanism for
service interruptions or load management in place.
Load management is characterisable in two main forms. The rst is price-
based and involves the use of an elevated service price (or a spot price) that
is communicated to the consumers in real time, to encourage them to volun-
tarily reduce their power demand whenever there is inadequate supply. The
limitation to this approach is that available information on the price respon-
siveness of demand during such critical periods may be sketchy, rendering
any predictions on the size of the realised demand reductions unreliable.
Furthermore, the infrastructure that is required to communicate informa-
tion on real-time prices to consumers remains non-existent in the majority
of power systems.
The second form of load management is quantity-based and involves the
involuntary rationing of demand whenever the power supply is inadequate.
Such schemes may also involve the payment of nancial compensations to
consumers to placate them for the losses from being involuntarily rationed.
Such an approach may however raise complications when consumers, in the
intention of maximising their anticipated compensations, choose to adjust
their demands pro-actively.1
The problem of service pricing when there is supply (or demand) risk
along with some form of load management being implemented, is closely re-
1This would tend to occur in situations where the expected compensation depends on
the consumers demand level.
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lated to an extensive literature on public utility pricing and capacity choice
with a risky supply or stochastic demand (see for example Brown and John-
son (1969), Panzar and Sibley (1978), Sherman and Visscher (1978) and
Coate and Panzar (1989)). A recurrent feature of such analyses is that
the service being provided (which is in most cases electric power) is non-
storable and the supply-demand balance must be maintained by interrupting
(or "managing") the systems load, often involuntarily, to conform with avail-
able supply. These analyses di¤er from the "peak, o¤-peak" styled analyses
in that they focus on load management during a single period, rather than
across multiple periods having di¤ering levels of realised demand. As a fore-
runner of the use of compensation to buttress load management, Serra (1997)
examined service pricing under a scheme which required that consumers pay
a basic rate for each unit actually consumed, and receive compensation for
every unit of demand voluntarily reduced below their normal consumption
level during a supply shortage.
Our objective in this paper is to examine service pricing under a simple
load management scheme that nancially compensates consumers whenever
the inadequacy of power supply necessitates interruptions. In the presented
set-up, each consumer pre-selects a (notional or ex ante) demand level that
is xed for a designated future period, at an assured price. In the event that
the available power supply during this period is inadequate, all demands will
be equally rationed in proportion to the available supply and compensation
is then paid for any unserved demand. The task facing the power utility in
this setting is two-fold. The rst is to determine the service price and com-
pensation levels that actualise its stated objective, which may be to either
maximise expected prot or expected welfare, while the second is to im-
plement supply interruptions whenever required, in order to avoid systemic
breakdown.
An interesting question raised whenever supply interruptions are com-
bined with the payment of interruption compensations concerns how con-
sumers would be induced to adapt their consumption behaviours. Would
they tend to boost their demands articially when the possibility of receiv-
ing tangible compensations is dangled? Or would any identiable change
in their demands simply be a natural response to an increase in the risk of
being interrupted? A related question is how consumer perceptions on the
reliability of future power supplies or the extent to which such supplies would
be inadequate (thereby necessitating interruptions) would inuence demand
behaviour and the actual reliability of such supplies? Also, how should the
service prices be determined, and then what implications would these have
for the schemes implementability?
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Intuitively, a stronger perception of the reliability of future supplies or
a decrease in the risk of power supplies being inadequate, would tend to
induce a higher ex ante power demand. Take for example a situation in
which positive perceptions about the reliability of such future supplies would
persuade consumers to make larger advance purchases of raw materials, to
be used as part of a power-intensive production process. Hence, a higher
perception of reliable supplies would presumably result in an increasing ex
ante power demand.2
Our analysis adds precision to this insight by identifying that a con-
sumers ex ante power demand, while decreasing in the power price and
increasing in the compensation rate, will also be increasing when there is a
mean-preserving spread in the riskiness of future supplies, provided his coef-
cient of relative prudence is high enough (exceeds two) and his coe¢ cient
of interruption aversion exceeds one.3 This is because while an increasing
riskiness associated with future supplies would ordinarily make future con-
sumption less attractive and thereby reduce the ex ante demand, a high
degree of prudence or precautionary behaviour would induce the consumer
to increase his demand in order to secure the desired future consumption
level. Furthermore, a su¢ cient condition for the consumers demand to be
increasing in the expected aggregate demand is that the coe¢ cients of relative
prudence and interruption aversion exceed three and one respectively.
We also identify that the mark-up of the optimal service price when there
is supply uncertainty (with the risk of interruption), expressed as a per-
centage of the optimal price under capacity adequacy (without the risk of
interruption), depends positively on both the degree of relative risk aver-
sion and of relative prudence. An intuitive explanation for this is that a
higher degree of prudence underscores the consumers precautionary motive
for boosting his ex ante demand when there is supply uncertainty and this
demand expansione¤ect must be mitigated by the mark-up.
We commence the analysis by presenting the model in the next section.
Section 3 follows with an analysis of consumer behaviour, while section 4
examines optimal pricing by the power utility under an expected welfare
maximisation objective.4 Section 5 concludes.
2See Coate and Panzar (1989) for a formalization that supports this line of intuition.
3We will later dene a consumers aversion to being rationed-o¤ by the co-e¢ cient of
interruption aversion. The measure of prudence describes the extent to which a consumers
behaviour is inuenced by a precautionary motive, or the extent to which he/she when
faced with supply uncertainty, would be willing to take advance measures to mitigate the
utility loss from being rationed-o¤.
4Prot maximisation is identiably a special case of the welfare maximisation problem,
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2 The Model
Consider a power system or a subset of such a system in which a load-
management scheme with compensation payments is to be introduced. The
service is provided by a monopolist power utility and no distinction is made
between the supply of electric power and usage of the network. The cost of
service is a constant b per unit (kilowatt hour).
There is a continuum of identical consumers with size mass normalised
to 1. The representative consumer derives benet from the consumption
of electricity and a numéraire commodity and has a lump sum income m
from which he pays for power supply that is priced at p per unit. His utility
function takes the quasi-linear form:
U (x; Y ) = u (x) + Y;
where x is the amount of electricity consumed and Y = m px is the income
leftover for consumption of the numéraire. It is assumed that u0 > 0, u00 <
0, u000 > 0 and limx!0 u0(x) = +1. For future reference, we dene the
coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence w.r.t. electricity
consumption as Rr(x)
def
=  u00(x)x
u0(x) and Pr(x)
def
=  u000(x)x
u00(x) , respectively.
Power supply is represented by a random variable T with the commonly
known cumulative distribution function F (T ). The realisation of this vari-
able is exogenous to the consumer. The adequacy of power supplies during
the supply period is uncertain and the extent to which the aggregate power
demand Xa exceeds the realised supply is the level of supply inadequacy or
excess demand. It is commonly known that a positive level of supply in-
adequacy will result in power consumption being interrupted or rationed-o¤
and a compensation being paid out for the undelivered part. The consumers
anticipation of the power supply being adequate is given by:
Pr (T > Xe) = [1  F (Xe)] ;
where Xe is the consumers expectation of the aggregate demand. The as-
sumed rationality of this expectation requires that Xe = Xa.
The scheme unfolds as follows: (1) The power utility announces the power
price p and the compensation rate c in advance of the period. (2) The
consumer chooses an ex ante power demand x. (3a) This demand will default
as his uninterrupted power consumption if the realised supply is adequate.
(3b) If the realised supply is inadequate then his demand will be interrupted
and emerges as the shadow cost of public funds tends to innity.
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using an equi-proportional rationing rule that curtails his power consumption
down to T
Xe
x. (4) The consumer is then compensated for any undelivered
portion of his power demand at the rate c.
3 Consumer behaviour
The rst question we are interested in answering is how the consumer would
behave in choosing his ex ante power demand and to what extent this demand
would be inuenced by the prospect of his being compensated whenever
interrupted? The consumers ex ante demand for electricity is the solution
to the following utility maximisation problem:
max
x
V =
Z Xe
0

u

T
Xe
x

+m  p T
Xe
x+ c

1  T
Xe

x

dF (T )
+ [u (x) +m  px] [1  F (Xe)] : (1)
We will examine the solution under two expectations scenarios. In the rst
scenario, the consumer anticipates that the realised supply will be adequate
and no interruptions will occur. In the second, he anticipates that the realised
supply will be inadequate and that rationing with compensation will take
place with some positive probability.
3.1 Case A: Adequate power supply
If adequate supply is anticipated then Pr (T > Xe) = 1 meaning F (Xe) = 0.
The consumers problem then reduces to
max
x
V = u (x) +m  px;
where the solution x satises the necessary condition:
u0 (x) = p: (2)
Writing the individual demand as
x = x (p) ; (3)
the aggregate demand, Xa, also amounts to x(p) and the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium condition requires that Xe = Xa = x (p). This can only
be an equilibrium if F [x(p)] = 0.
Comparative statics in this scenario are simple:
@x
@p
=
1
u00 (x)
< 0, and " =
@x
@p
p
x
=   1
Rr(x)
< 0:
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3.2 Case B: Inadequate power supply
However if a situation with inadequate supply is anticipated with some pos-
itive probability then Pr (T > Xe) < 1 and F (Xe) > 0. The power demand
x^ that solves problem (1) must now satisfy the necessary condition:
u
0
(x^) [1  F (Xe)] +
Z Xe
0
u
0

T
Xe
x^

T
Xe
dF (T )
= p

[1  F (Xe)] +
Z Xe
0
T
Xe
dF (T )

 
Z Xe
0
c

1  T
Xe

dF (T ) :(4)
Applying integration by parts on
R Xe
0
T
Xe
dF (T ) and
R Xe
0
u
0   T
Xe
x^

T
Xe
al-
lows us to rewrite this rst order condition as5
u
0
(x^) = p

1 
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT

  c
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT
 
Z Xe
0
u
0   T
Xe
x^
 
Rr
 
T
Xe
x^
  1
Xe
F (T )dT: (5)
We may write demand in this scenario as
x^ = x^ (p; c;Xe) : (6)
The second-order condition will be assumed to be satised. It is instructive
to rewrite it as:6
SOCx^ =  bu0bx
8<:bRr + 1Xe
XeZ
0
eu0bu0 eRr( ePr   2)F (T )dT
9=; ; (7)
where b above an expression means evaluation at bx, while emeans evaluation
at bxT
Xe
. A su¢ ciently high relative prudence will thus ensure the second order
condition to be veried.
5Integration by parts gives:Z Xe
0
T
Xe
dF (T ) = F (Xe) 
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dTZ Xe
0
u
0

T
Xe
x^

T
Xe
dF (T ) = u
0
(x^)F (Xe) 
Z Xe
0
u
0   T
Xe x^

Xe
"
u
00   T
Xe x^

u0
 
T
Xe x^
 T
Xe
x^+ 1
#
F (T ) dT
where it is here assumed that lim
T!0
u
0   T
Xe x^

T
Xe = 0.
6See equation (A.1) in the appendix for a derivation of the second-order condition.
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3.3 Comparing the necessary conditions
Comparing the conditions (2) and (5) allows us to understand the conse-
quences of pessimistic expectations on the ex ante power demand. Before
doing so, it is useful to rewrite (5) by noting that 1
Xe
R Xe
0
T
F (Xe)
dF (T ) =
E[T jTXe]
Xe
, is the consumers expectation of the degree of available supply ca-
pacity, given that such capacity is regarded as inadequate. We may therefore
dene the expected degree of supply reliability as
r(Xe)
def
= F (Xe)
E [T j T  Xe]
Xe
+ [1  F (Xe)] ;
which has the property that r0(Xe) =  F (Xe) E[T jTXe]
(Xe)2
< 0 which intu-
itively says that the expected degree of supply reliability will be decreasing
in the level of expected demand. The rst order condition in (5) may now
be rewritten as
u0 (x^) +
Z Xe
0
u0
 
T
Xe
x^
 
Rr
 
T
Xe
x^
  1
Xe
F (T )dT =
r(Xe)  p  [1  r(Xe)]  c: (8)
For a consumer with a logarithmic utility function for electricity, Rr  1
and the second lhs term vanish. The optimal demand for electricity then
equates the consumers marginal utility with a net marginal outlay deter-
mined by the price, and compensation, both discounted for the reliability
rate. Since the reliability rate is less than one under pessimistic expecta-
tions, the consumer will boost his ex ante order of electricity, both because
the expected price to be paid is lower, and because a compensation is paid
out for each undelivered unit. This is a rst reason for having x^ > x.
The second reason stems from the second lhs term. This term accom-
modates the utility consequences of a marginal ordered unit in those states
of the world where supply is insu¢ cient. A benchmark value for relative
risk aversion is 1 (see, e.g., Eeckhoudt, Ethner and Schroyen, 2007). If the
consumer is highly risk averse w.r.t. electricity consumption (Rr > 1), the
marginal utility of an extra unit ordered is enhanced, because it will boost
the delivery when rationing takes place. This is a second reason for having
x^ > x.
3.4 Comparative statics at the individual level
In this section, we investigate how the consumer who anticipates interrup-
tions will adjust his ex ante order of electricity due to marginal changes in
8
p, c, and Xe, as well as a marginal increase in the uncertainty surrounding
the supply capacity.
Simple comparative statics on (8) shows that
@x^
@p
=   bx r(Xe)
bu0
8<:bRr + 1Xe
XeZ
0
eu0bu0 eRr( ePr   2)F (T )dT
9=;
< 0, and (9)
@x^
@c
=
bx [1  r(Xe)]
bu0
8<:bRr + 1Xe
XeZ
0
eu0bu0 eRr( ePr   2)F (T )dT
9=;
> 0: (10)
Results (9) and (10) support the intuitive notion that the consumers power
demand will be decreasing in the power price and increasing in the compen-
sation rate. The corresponding elasticity expressions are involved, but with
logarithmic utility (for which Rr (x)  1 and Pr (x)  2) they reduce to:
@x^
@p
pbx =   r(Xe) pr(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c =  r(Xe) pbx < 0, and (11)
@x^
@c
cbx = [1  r(Xe)] cr(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c = [1  r(Xe)] cbx > 0; (12)
since (8) reduces to 1bx = r(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c.
How will the consumers power demand respond to a small change in the
expected aggregate demand? We have
@x^
@Xe
=   1
XeSOCx^
f
Z Xe
0
u0 (ex)[Rr (ex)  1]2  R0r (ex) ex	 F (T )Xe dT
 r0(Xe)Xe (p+ c) + u0 (x^) [Rr (x^)  1]g : (13)
Clearly, the curly bracket term can take on any sign. To x ideas, we may
rst consider the logarithmic utility function u (x) = lnx. Then (13) reduces
to
@x^
@Xe
=
 x^r0(Xe)(p+ c)
r(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c =  x^
2r0(Xe)(p+ c)  0; (14)
where the second equality follows from (8). In elasticity terms, this gives
@x^
@Xe
Xe
x^
=
 Xer0(Xe)(p+ c)
r(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c =
(p+ c) [r(Xe) + F (Xe)  1]
r(Xe) p  [1  r(Xe)] c ; (15)
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so that
@x^
@Xe
Xe
x^
? 1() 1  F (X
e)
F (Xe)
7 c
p
: (16)
Thus with a small compensation rate, the elasticity of individual demand
w.r.t. expected aggregate demand will fall short of unity.
Relaxing the logarithmic utility assumption and reverting to the general
result means we must now sign the numerator of (13) with the second and
third terms present. Re-writing the expression within the curly brackets
of the third term as 1 + [Pr (x)  3]Rr (x), it is inferable that a relative
prudence larger than 3 and a relative risk aversion exceeding one are su¢ cient
conditions for the consumer to order more ex ante when his expectation about
the level of aggregate demand increases.
Finally, we examine the e¤ect of a marginal increase in supply uncertainty
or in the risk of interruptions on the consumers demand through a mean
preserving spread in the probability distribution for supply. For this purpose,
we introduce a new probability distribution for the supply capacity, G() that
has the same mean as F () but second order stochastically dominates the
latter. We then dene the probability distribution
H (T; )
def
= (1  )F (T ) + G (T ) ; (17)
so that a marginal increase in  can be considered as a marginal increase
in risk. By the denition of a mean preserving spread (see Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970)), we must have thatZ 1
0
H (T; ) dT = 0, and (18)Z z
0
H (T; ) dT  0;8 z 2 [0;1) : (19)
The important observation is that the consumers expected marginal util-
ity behaves asymmetrically around T = Xe where it displays a kink.7 This
is intuitive, as in situations with T > Xe no interruption occurs and the
necessary condition is simply the marginal utility from power consumption
less the power price. But with T < Xe, the occurrence of interruptions im-
plies that the necessary condition be adjusted to reect the rationed demand
and compensation payments. A mean preserving spread will thus a¤ect the
expected net marginal benet of an ex ante power demand only to the extent
that it a¤ects the likelihood of those states in which the consumer anticipates
to be rationed. This is presented in the gure below.
7The e¤ect of a kink in the payo¤ function was rst discussed by Kanbur (1982).
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TdV/dx
0
u’(x) - p
XeT<Xe T>Xe
Kink in the necessary
condition at T=Xe
Figure 1. – Showing the asymmetry of the necessary condition to the consumer’s
problem around T=Xe.
u’(Tx/Xe)T/Xe –pT/Xe + c(1-T/Xe)
We may now rewrite the necessary condition in (5) as:
u0 (x^)  p+
Z Xe
0

u0

T
Xe
x^

Rr

T
Xe
x^

  1

+ p+ c

H(T; )
Xe
dT;
and then di¤erentiate completely to obtain:
@x^
@
( SOCx^) =
Z Xe
0

u0

T
Xe
x^

Rr

T
Xe
x^

  1

+ p+ c

H(T; )
Xe
dT;
(20)
which upon using partial integration gives
@x^
@
( SOCx^) = fu0 (x^) [Rr (x^)  1] + p+ cg
Z Xe
0
H(T; )dT (21)
+
Z Xe
0
u0

T
Xe
x^

Rr

T
Xe
x^

Pr

T
Xe
x^

  2

1
T
 Z T
0
H(S; )dS
!
dT:
The conditions for a mean preserving spread imply that the two under-
lined terms are strictly positive. The standard e¤ect of an increase in risk
on the control variable x^ is given by the second rhs term. If the coe¢ cient
of relative prudence exceeds 2, the consumer will place a higher order. This
result is reminiscent of the analysis of precautionary savings behaviour: if the
rate of return to savings becomes more risky, the consumer will increase the
amount saved if and only if his relative prudence exceeds 2 (this result dates
back to Leland (1968); a modern account is found in Eeckhoudt, Gollier and
Schlesinger (2005): 98-99). Prudence needs to be high enough to place a
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higher order because on the one hand a more risky distribution makes the
consumption of electricity less attractive, but on the other hand, the increase
in risk makes the consumer more precautious.
In addition to the standard e¤ect, there is a second e¤ect at work that
is represented by the rst rhs term of (21). If the consumer were very
pessimistic about the adequacy of supply capacity, for example with Xe very
large or tending towards +1, then the underlined term would vanish by
condition (18). Otherwise, a su¢ cient condition for the rst term to be
positive is that Rr(x^) exceeds 1.
With logarithmic utility, (21) reduces to
@x^
@
=
(p+ c)
R Xe
0
H(T; )dT
r(Xe)p  [1  r(Xe)] c > 0; (22)
showing that an increase in risk unambiguously increases demand.
3.5 Comparative statics under rational expectations
Prior to now we have treated the expected aggregate demand as an exoge-
nously dened variable. But with rational expectations, these expecta-
tions are endogenous and need to be conrmed in equilibrium. Imposing
Xe = x^ (p; c;Xe) and the stability condition j @x^
@Xe
j < 1, we have
@x^
@p
jeqb = @X
e
@p
=
@x^
@p
1  @x^
@Xe
 and @x^
@c
jeqb = @X
e
@c
=
@x^
@c
1  @x^
@Xe
 : (23)
Making use of @X
e
@p
, @X
e
@c
and @x^
@Xe
, we obtain
@x^
@p
jeqb =   x^ r(x^)
u0 (x^)
n
[1  F (x^)] [1 Rr (x^)]  pu0(x^) [1  F (x^)] + cu0(x^)F (x^)
o < 0;
(24)
and
@x^
@c
jeqb = x^ [1  r(x^)]
u0 (x^)
n
[1  F (x^)] [1 Rr (x^)]  pu0(x^) [1  F (x^)] + cu0(x^)F (x^)
o > 0:
(25)
Note that the stability assumption ensures that the denominator is positive.
Therefore, also in equilibrium, the price and compensation rates have the
expected sign. With logarithmic utility, these marginal e¤ects, in elasticity
form, reduce to
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@x^
@p
p
x^
jeqb =   r(x^)
[1  F (x^)]  c
p
F (x^)
< 0; (26)
and
@x^
@c
c
x^
jeqb = c
p
[1  r(x^)]
[1  F (x^)]  c
p
F (x^)
> 0: (27)
In absolute value, the price and compensation elasticities are thus larger in
equilibrium than at the individual level. The reason is the multiplier e¤ect
of expectations.
4 Welfare maximising pricing
We now study the choice of p and c that maximise social welfare. Social
welfare is dened as the sum of expected consumer surplus V and expected
prot, while accounting for the fact that any loss which the public rm
makes has to be nanced through distortionary taxation on other economic
activities, or alternatively, that any prot allows for a reduction in such
taxation costs. Denoting the shadow cost of public funds by  > 0, the
problem of the regulator is then
max
p  0; c  0
W
def
= V + (1 + )E; (28)
where V is the consumers expected utility from (1) and E is the Utilitys
expected prot dened as follows:
E
def
= (p  b)

x 
Z x
0

1  T
x

xdF (T )

 
Z x
0
c

1  T
x

xdF (T ) : (29)
Prot maximisation is a special case of (28) where !1.
4.1 Case A: Adequate power supply
Recognising that x = x (p;Xe) means that the Utilitys problem becomes:
max
p  0
W = u (x) +m  px+ (1 + ) (p  b)x (30)
and with u
0
(x) = p the optimal price, p, necessarily satises
@W
@p
= x (p) + (1 + ) (p   b)xp = 0: (31)
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Writing " = d log x

d log p , this rst order condition results in the mark-up rule
p

1  
1 + 
1
"

= b: (32)
Note that as ! +1, (32) reverts to the expected prot maximising result.
4.2 Case B: Inadequate power supply
Recognising x as dened in (6) and the rational expectations equilibrium
x^ = x^ (p; c; x^) in (28) gives the necessary conditions:
@W
@p
=
h
u
0
(x^) x^p   x^  px^p
i
[1  F (x^)] + cx^pF (x^)  E [T j T  x^]F (x^)
+ (1 + ) fx^r(x^) + x^p [(p  b) [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^)]g ; (33)
@W
@c
=
h
u
0
(x^) x^c   px^c
i
[1  F (x^)] + cx^cF (x^) + x^F (x^)  E [T ]F (x^) (34)
  (1 + ) f(F (x^) x^  F (x^)E [T ])  x^c [(p  b) [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^)]g ;
and using the demand-price derivative from (24) in (33) and then re-arranging
gives:
u
0
(x^)

1  
1 + 
Rr (x^)

= b; (35)
which implicitly denes the welfare maximising p^.
A necessary condition for a nite price p^ to maximise prots is that the
square bracket term is positive. This puts an upper bound on the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion given as:
Rr <
1 + 

:
When the aim is to maximise prots (i.e.  ! +1), Rr is bounded away
from 1. If  = 0:2 (0:3), then Rr must not exceed 6 (413).
Recognising (25) in (34) with c^ > 0 yields exactly the same condition
as (35). This suggests that one of the two instruments is redundant. The
reason is of course the quasi-linear nature of the cardinal utility function.
This means that the consumer is risk neutral w.r.t. the numéraire. Even
though he does not like interruptions in the supply of electricity, it su¢ ces
to compensate the consumer for the expected level of interuption, and this
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is equally well carried out through the ex ante price p. In the remainder of
the discussion we will therefore normalise the compensation rate to zero.
Since "(x) = u
0(x)
u00(x)x =   1Rr(x) , the necessary conditions in the adequate
and inadequate supply cases are identical, meaning that the optimal ex ante
ordered amount of electricity is the same, no matter whether the supply
capacity is regarded as adequate or not. A consequence is that the price bp
needs to be chosen such that it implements the quantity x also under an
inadequate supply capacity.
Earlier, we concluded that for a given price, the consumer will place a
higher ex ante order when he anticipates inadequate supply, relative to when
he anticipates adequate supply. Hence bp needs to exceed p to choke o¤ the
ex ante demand, and to equalise the demand in both cases.
Using the consumers necessary condition (5) with c^ = 0, we may ask
what the price should be in order for him to place an order x under supply
inadequacy. The answer is:
p^ (x) =
u0 (x)  R x
0
u
0
(T ) [1 Rr (T )] F (T )x dT
r (x)
: (36)
To gain a better understanding of this expression, taking a linear expansion
of u
0
(T ) [1 Rr (T )] around T = x gives:
u0 (T ) [1 Rr (T )] ' u0 (x)

[1 Rr (x)] +Rr (x) [2  Pr(x)] x
   T
x

;
(37)
and allows us to approximate the second numerator term on the RHS of (36)
as: Z x
0
u
0
(T ) [1 Rr (T )] F (T )
x^
dT ' (38)
u0 [1 +Rr(1  P r )]

1  E(T jT < x
)
x

 Rr [2  P r ]
1
2

1  E(T
2jT < x)
x2

F ;
where  denotes an evaluation at x. And since u0 = p, (36) may now be
rearranged as Since u0 = p, (36) may now be rearranged as
p^ (x)  p
p
' (39)
Rr(P

r   1)
(1  r)
r
+
1
2
RrF
(P r   2)
1  E(T 2jT<x)
x2
r
:
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Thus the mark-up of the optimal price under supply uncertainty, expressed as
a % of the optimal price under capacity adequacy, depends positively on both
the degree of relative risk aversion and of relative prudence. Intuitively, a
strong degree of prudence underscores the consumers precautionary motive
when ordering electricity. This boosts ex ante demand which has to be
mitigated through a higher price. In the special case of logarithmic utility,
this mark-up reduces to
p^ (x)  p
p
=
1  r
r
: (40)
Thus a perceived reliability of 75% requires a price exceeding base level with
33%.
5 Conclusion
The prime rationale underlying load management has been to increasingly
shift the burden of risk associated with random events within a power system
to the demand-side.
Problems related to riskiness in the availability of supply have tradition-
ally been viewed as warranting supply-side solutions, notably in the form of
additional capacity investment, over the medium to the longer term. It is
however evident that with the proper design and implementation of interrup-
tion schemes, such matters may be cost e¤ectively addressed by short-term
demand-side solutions, provided the incentives given to consumers are su¢ -
ciently attractive.
This paper has put forward a relatively simple framework for implement-
ing supply interruptions with nancial compensation. In analysing the work-
ings of the proposed scheme, the key issues examined have been: How the
service price and interruption compensation should be dened, how con-
sumer demands would respond to the schemes introduction, and then how
such demands would be inuenced by the perceived reliability of future power
supplies.
Four elements are identied as playing key roles in determining the size of
a consumers ex ante demand, notably whether this will expand or contract
relative to a benchmark power demand determined in a scenario that is devoid
of any anticipated interruptions. These are: the perceived reliability of future
power supplies, the size of the expected incentives or compensation payments,
the consumers distaste for interruptions and the strength of the consumers
prudence.
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The presented framework has also emphasised the role of expectations
in dening consumer behaviour. Although rational expectations and knowl-
edgeable consumers are strong assumptions to make in any realistic setting,
they are nevertheless plausible by appealing to schemes in which consumers
are well informed about the power system and possess adequate computa-
tional capabilities to support rational decision making. Similarly, assuming
xed power demands for a particular period is not unduly restrictive in that
provided that consumers face xed power prices, then their power demands
will also tend to be xed.
A limitation of the current framework is however the di¢ culty in distin-
guishing between the optimal policies for the power price and interruption
compensation. An explanation for this is the linearity of the consumers util-
ity in income and the linearity of the power utilitys objective in the power
price and compensation. These give similar necessary conditions that do not
allow for unique policy denitions. Resolving this makes desirable an amend-
ment to the current framework in which the objective functions are allowed
to be non-linear in the policy variables and with risk aversion introduced
with respect to income.
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Appendices
A Comparative statics on the power demand
A.1 The second-order condition
SOCx^
def
= u00 (x^) +
Z Xe
0

u00

T
Xe
x^

T
Xe

Rr

T
Xe
x^

  1

(A.1)
+ u0

T
Xe
x^

R0r

T
Xe
x^

T
Xe
F (T )
Xe

dT < 0
A.2 The e¤ect of a change in the power price
In the case with adequate supply, di¤erentiating the rst order condition in
(2) with respect to p and x gives:
@x
@p
=  
@FOCx
@p
@FOCx
@x
=
1
u00 (x)
< 0 (A.2)
In the case with inadequate supply, di¤erentiating the rst order condition
in (5) with respect to p and dening T
Xe
x^  x gives:
@FOCx^
@p
=
@u
0
(x^)
@p
 

1 
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT

+
@
@p
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]F (T )
Xe
dT
(A.3)
where
@
@p
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]
Xe
F (T ) dT
=
Z Xe
0
@u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]
@p
F (T )
Xe
dT (A.4)
=
Z Xe
0
(
u
00
(x)
@ T x^
Xe
@p
[Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)
@ T x^
Xe
@p
)
F (T )
Xe
dT = 0
meaning that
@FOCx^
@p
=  

1 
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT

(A.5)
A similar operation with respect to x^ gives
@FOCx^
@x^
= u
00
(x^) +
Z Xe
0
@u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]
@x^
F (T )
Xe
dT (A.6)
19
where Z Xe
0
@u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]
@x^
F (T )
Xe
dT
=
Z Xe
0
(
u
00
(x)
@ T x^
Xe
@x^
[Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)
@ T x^
Xe
@x^
)
F (T )
Xe
dT(A.7)
=
Z Xe
0

u
00
(x)
T
Xe
[Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)
T
Xe

F (T )
Xe
dT
meaning that
@FOCx^
@x^
= u
00
(x^)+
Z Xe
0

u
00
(x)
T
Xe
[Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)
T
Xe

F (T )
Xe
dT
(A.8)
Combining (A.5) and (A.9) gives
@x^
@p
=  
@FOCx^
@p
@FOCx^
@x^
=
n
1  R Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT
o
u00 (x^) +
R Xe
0

u00 (x) T
Xe
[Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x) TXe
	 F (T )
Xe
dT
(A.9)
Satisfying the second order condition for x^ means that the denominator in
(A.9) is required to be weakly negative. It must however be strictly nega-
tive for the comparative static to be meaningful. To check the sign on the
denominator, we may re-express this as:
u
00
(x^) +
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x)
T
Xe
n
Ra (x) [1 Rr (x)] +R0r (x)
o F (T )
Xe
dT (A.10)
and the curly bracket term in (A.10) as:
Ra (x) [1 Rr (x)] +R0r (x)
=
 u00 (x) u0 (x) + u00 (x) x
(u0 (x))2
  u
0
(x)

u
000
(x) x+ u
00
(x)
	   u00 (x)2 x
(u0 (x))2
=
 u000 (x) x
u0 (x)
  2u
00
(x)
u0 (x)
(A.11)
=   [Pr (x)  2]Ra (x)
where Pr (x)   u
000
(x)x
u
00
(x)
is the coe¢ cient of relative prudence, describing the
degree of convexity in the consumers marginal utility from power consump-
tion. Inserting (A.11) into (A.10) gives
u
00
(x^) 
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x)
T
Xe
[Pr (x)  2]Ra (x) F (T )
Xe
dT (A.12)
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we will assume that (A.12) is strictly negative. Finally, re-inserting (A.12)
into (A.9) gives
@x^
@p
=
n
1  R Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT
o
u00 (x^)  R Xe
0
u0 (x) T
Xe
[Pr (x)  2]Ra (x) F (T )Xe dT
(A.13)
A strictly positive numerator in (A.13) ensures that @x^
@p
will be strictly nega-
tive.
A.3 The e¤ect of a change in the compensation rate
Di¤erentiating the foc with respect to c gives
@FOCx^
@c
=
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT +
Z Xe
0
@u
0
(x) [Rr (x)  1]
@c
F (T )
Xe
dT (A.14)
as in (A.4), the second term on the RHS of (A.14) will be 0. Combining
(A.14) and (A.12) gives
@x^
@c
=  
@FOCx^
@c
@FOCx^
@x^
=  
R Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT
u00 (x^)  R Xe
0
u0 (x) T
Xe
[Pr (x)  2]Ra (x) F (T )Xe dT
(A.15)
A strictly negative denominator in (A.15) implies that the sign of @x^
@Xe
will
mirror that of the numerator. Having the numerator strictly positive there-
fore implies that @x^
@c
will also be strictly positive.
A.4 The e¤ect of a change in the expected aggregate
demand
Di¤erentiating the foc wrt Xe gives
@FOCx^
@Xe
=
(p+ c)F (Xe)
Xe

1  1
F (Xe)
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT

+
@
R Xe
0
u
0
(x)[Rr(x) 1]
Xe
F (T ) dT
@Xe
(A.16)
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where
@
R Xe
0
u
0
(x)[Rr(x) 1]
Xe
F (T ) dT
@Xe
=
u
0
(x^) [Rr (x^)  1]F (Xe)
Xe
+
Z Xe
0
@ u
0
(x)[Rr(x) 1]
Xe
@Xe
F (T ) dT
= ::+
Z Xe
0
Xe @u
0
(x)[Rr(x) 1]
@Xe
  u0 (x) [Rr (x)  1]
(Xe)2
F (T ) dT (A.17)
= ::+
Z Xe
0
8<:Xe
@ T x^
Xe
@Xe

u
00
(x) [Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)
  u0 (x) [Rr (x)  1]
(Xe)2
9=;F (T ) dT
= ::+
Z Xe
0
(
 x u00 (x) [Rr (x)  1] + u0 (x)R0r (x)  u0 (x) [Rr (x)  1]
Xe
)
F (T )
Xe
dT
= ::+
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x)
Xe
n
[Rr (x)  1]2  R0r (x) x
o F (T )
Xe
dT
meaning that
@FOCx^
@Xe
= (p+ c)
F (Xe)
Xe

1  1
F (Xe)
Z Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT

+u
0
(x^) [Rr (x^)  1] F (X
e)
Xe
(A.18)
+
Z Xe
0
u
0
(x)
n
[Rr (x)  1]2  R0r (x) x
o F (T )
Xe2
dT
Combining (A.18) and (A.12) gives
@x^
@Xe
=  
@FOCx^
@Xe
@FOCx^
@x^
=  
1
Xe
8><>:
(p+ c)F (Xe)
n
1  1
F (Xe)
R Xe
0
F (T )
Xe
dT
o
+u
0
(x^) [Rr (x^)  1]F (Xe)
+
R Xe
0
u
0
(x)

[Rr (x)  1]2  R0r (x) x
	
F (T )
Xe
dT
9>=>;
u00 (x^)  R Xe
0
u0 (x) T
Xe
[Pr (x)  2]Ra (x) F (T )Xe dT
(A.19)
As earlier, a strictly negative denominator implies that the sign of @x^
@Xe
will
mirror that of the numerator. Using (7), the expression within curly brackets
in the rst term of the numerator is equivalently E[T jT<X
e]
Xe
, which is positive.
The rst term must therefore be weakly positive. The second term will also
be weakly positive provided the consumer has a normal or high aversion to
being interrupted i.e. Rr (x^)  1, but will be negative if otherwise. We may
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resolve the term within curly brackets in the third term by writing:
[Rr (x)  1]2  R0r (x) x
=

u
00
(x) x+ u
0
(x)
2
(u0 (x))2
+
u
0
(x) x

u
000
(x) x+ u
00
(x)
	   u00 (x)2 x2
(u0 (x))2
=
3u
00
(x)u
0
(x) x+
 
u
0
(x)
2
+ u
000
(x)u
0
(x) x2
(u0 (x))2
(A.20)
= 3
u
00
(x)
u0 (x)
x+ 1 +
u
000
(x)
u0 (x)
x2
=  3 u
00
(x) x
u0 (x)
+ 1 +
 u000 (x) x
u00 (x)
 u00 (x) x
u0 (x)
= 1 + [Pr (x)  3]Rr (x)
re-inserting (A.20) into (A.19) means that
@x^
@Xe
=  
1
Xe
(
(p+ c) E[T jT<X
e]
Xe
F (Xe) + u
0
(x^) [Rr (x^)  1]F (Xe)
+
R Xe
0
u
0
(x) f1 + [Pr (x)  3]Rr (x)g F (T )Xe dT
)
u00 (x^)  R Xe
0
u0 (x) T
Xe
[Pr (x)  2]Ra (x) F (T )Xe dT
(A.21)
If the consumer possesses a coe¢ cient of relative prudence that weakly ex-
ceeds 3, then the third term will be assuredly positive, otherwise the sign is
not obvious. It is thus a¢ rmable that the numerator and therefore @x^
@Xe
will
be weakly positive provided: Rr (x^)  1 and Pr (x)  3.
B Comparative statics on the expected ag-
gregate demand
B.1 The e¤ect of a change in the power price
In a rational expectations equilibrium with N = 1, the expected aggregate
demand would be Xe = x^ (p; c;Xe). Di¤erentiating this completely with
respect to p gives:
@Xe
@p
=

@x^
@p
+
@x^
@Xe
@Xe
@p

(B.1)
and then re-arranging to obtain
@Xe
@p
=
@x^
@p
1  @x^
@Xe
 (B.2)
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Note that the stability of this equilibrium requires @x^
@Xe
< 1. Rewriting the
equilibrium second-order condition to the consumers problem (which is also
the denominator in the comparative static results @x^
@p
; @x^
@c
and @x^
@Xe
) as:
SOCin eqb. =
u
0
(x^)
x^

 Rr (x^) 
Z x^
0
u
0
(T )
u0 (x^)
[Pr (T )  2]Rr (T ) F (T )
x^
dT

(B.3)
using (13) means that

1  @x^
@Xe

in eqb .
=
 u
0
(x^)
x^
Rr (x^) 
R x^
0
u
0
(T )
x^2
fRr (T )  1gF (T ) dT
+(p+ c) E[T jT<X
e]
x^2
F (x^) + 1
x^
u
0
(x^) [Rr (x^)  1]F (x^)
u0 (x^)
x^
n
 Rr (x^) 
R x^
0
u0 (T )
u0 (x^) [Pr (T )  2]Rr (T )
F (T )
x^
dT
o
(B.4)
from the consumers rst-order condition in (5) we will have in equilibrium
that
u
0
(x^)  p+ (p+ c)F (x^)
x^
=  
Z x^
0
u
0
(T )
x^2
[Rr (T )  1]F (T ) dT+(p+ c)F (x^) E [T j T < X
e]
x^2
(B.5)
recognising (B.5) in (B.4) gives

1  @x^
@Xe

in eqb .
=
u
0
(x^)
x^
n
[1  F (x^)] [1 Rr (x^)]  p[1 F (x^)]u0 (x^) +
cF (x^)
u0 (x^)
o
u0 (x^)
x^
n
 Rr (x^) 
R x^
0
u0 (T )
u0 (x^) [Pr (T )  2]Rr (T )
F (T )
x^
dT
o
(B.6)
and with @x^
@p
means that
@Xe
@p
j in eqb. =
"
@x^
@p
1  @x^
@Xe
#
in eqb.
(B.7)
=
x^
n
1  F (x^) (x^ E[T jT<x^])
x^
o
u0 (x^)
n
[1  F (x^)] [1 Rr (x^)]  pu0 (x^) [1  F (x^)] + cu0 (x^)F (x^)
o
Evaluating (B.7) with logarithmic utility gives8
@Xe
@p
=  
x^
n
1  F (x^) (x^ E[T jT<x^])
x^
o
p [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^) (B.8)
8It is helpful to re-collect that having u (x) = lnx implies: u
0
(x) = 1x ; u
00
(x) =
  1x2 ; u
000
(x) = 2x3 with Ra (x) =
1
x ; Rr (x) = 1 and Pr (x) = 2. Also that x =
T
Xe x^.
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B.2 The e¤ect of a change in the compensation rate
Di¤erentiating Xe  1:x^ (p; c;Xe) completely with respect to c gives
@Xe
@c
=
@x^
@c
1  @x^
@Xe
 (B.9)
as in (B.7) we will have that
@Xe
@c
jin eqb =
"
@x^
@c
1  @x^
@Xe
#
in eqb.
(B.10)
=
 x^F (x^) (x^ E[T jT<x^])
x^
u0 (x^)
n
[1  F (x^)] [1 Rr (x^)]  pu0 (x^) [1  F (x^)] + cu0 (x^)F (x^)
o
which with logarithmic utility becomes
@Xe
@c
jin eqb =
"
@x^
@c
1  @x^
@Xe
#
in eqb.
=
x^F (x^) (x^ E[T jT<x^])
x^
p [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^) (B.11)
C Pricing with consumer welfare maximisa-
tion and a budget restriction
C.1 Case B: Inadequate power supply
V = [u (x^) +m  px^] [1  F (x^)] +
Z x^
0
[u (T ) +m  pT + c (x^  T )] dF (T )
(C.1)
E =

(p  b)

x^ 
Z x^
0
(x^  T ) dF (T )

 
Z x^
0
c (x^  T ) dF (T )

(C.2)
Vp =
h
u
0
(x^) x^p   x^  px^p
i
[1  F (x^)]+cx^pF (x^) E [T j T  x^]F (x^) (C.3)
Ep = x^

1  F (x^) (x^  E [T j T  x^])
x^

+ x^p [(p  b) [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^)]
(C.4)
Vc =
h
u
0
(x^) x^c   px^c
i
[1  F (x^)] + cx^cF (x^) + x^F (x^)  E [T ]F (x^) (C.5)
Ec =   (F (x^) x^  F (x^)E [T ]) + x^c [(p  b) [1  F (x^)]  cF (x^)] (C.6)
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